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Procedural Politics and Federal Rule 26:
Opting-out of "Mandatory" Disclosure
By Eric K. Yamamoto* and Joseph L. Dwight IV**
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal profession has long labored with a sullied public image.
Whatever its genesis, public distaste often has been tempered by
perceptions of the necessity and worth of law, lawyers and a stable
legal system.' Those tempering perceptions, however, appear to have
faded. Harsh criticisms, and sometimes derision, emanate from legis-
lators, attorneys, clients, community groups, and study committees.2
The breadth and intensity of the criticism is perhaps unparalleled in
modern legal history.' Congress, 4 the federal executive branches, state
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Stephen Landsman, Adversarial Process (1985) (describing traditional views of the
adversarial legal system and recent criticisms).
2 See Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 559 (1992), [Hereinafter
Quayle, Civil Justice].
I See Vox Populi, The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll, ABA B. J. 60, (Sept.
1993) (revealing that lawyers had received a 40% approval rating and that 56% of
the respondents had volunteered an unfavorable impression of lawyers). See generally
Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 498,
516 (1912) (as an early critic of the modem legal system, criticizing employment of
"the whole energy of our judicial system. . .in working out a consistent, logical,
minutely precise body of [precedent]" without reference to larger social impacts).
Jeffrey Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, Or Crumbling Construct? Trends In
Adjudicatory Procedure, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 683 (1993) (discussing trends affecting
our understanding of adjudicatory procedure).
Congress has not been a completely silent partner of the judiciary in the
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legislatures, bar associations and community law groups have responded
by offering a plethora of litigation reforms.5 Federal and state judiciaries
also have responded by offering their own far-reaching packages of
reform. How are we to understand these overlapping, seemingly un-
coordinated, initiatives? Are they generated by groups with appropriate
authority and expertise? Will they fundamentally restructure the way
lawyers lawyer and judges judge? The way lawyers and clients relate?
The way disputes are resolved, and the kind of justice delivered? 6
The recent adoption of the mandatory disclosure amendments to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides an apt focal point for
discussion of these questions. These amendments, effective December
1, 1993, eliminate formal deposition-interrogatory-document discovery
at the front end of the pretrial process. They mandate a party's disclosure
of relevant information.7 No discovery requests are required or allowed
before disclosure. These amendments may well fundamentally change
the structure and tenor of civil litigation discovery procedure.8 For
formulation of litigation policy. In fact, in the area of substantive law Congress
has been quite active, by reversing or modifying Court decisions-particularly
regarding civil rights statutes-thought to be insufficiently sensitive to statutory
rights. Congress similarly enacted comprehensive copyright legislation in response
to perceived problems of copyright infringement unremedied through litigation.
But in the area of procedural law, Congress has ordinarily been less active,
usually deferring to the judicially led rulemaking process or responding to
judicially initiated calls for statutory reform.
Even before the current ferment, however, there were notable exceptions to
my posited world of judicially centered mechanism of court reform.
Id.
5 Adjudicatory procedure is the means by which particular litigation is admin-
istered. Litigation reform is the means by which aspects of the litigation process,
including adjudicatory procedure, are altered, marginalized, reduced in importance,
bypassed, eliminated or changed." Stempel, supra note 4, at 693-94.
6 Professor Jeffrey Stempel believes that the current changes in adjudicatory
procedure evidenced by the civil rules amendments will affect litigants disproportion-
ately. "I conclude that, on balance, the new order (or disorder) in litigation reform,
like the new order in adjudicatory procedure, weighs more in favor of the socioecon-
omically advantaged that did its predecessor." Stempel, supra note 4, at 695.
' See infra Part III. See also Ralph K. Winters, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58
BROOK. L. REV. 263 (1992) (supporting the mandatory disclosure provision to amended
Rule 26(a)(1); William H. Schwarzer, Query: Slaying the Monsters of Cost and Delay:
Would Mandatory Disclosure Be More Effective Than Discovery?, 74 JUDICATURE 178 (1991)
(favoring disclosure over discovery); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory
Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991) (hereinafter
"Hope Over Experience") (supporting mandatory disclosure).
1 See infra Part III.
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some courts, that is. Fifty-two federal district courts have in some
fashion opted-out of the most significant amendments to Rule 26. 9
Why have more than half the district courts opted-out? Why the dis-
uniformity nationwide?
The Rule 26 mandatory disclosure amendments have been embroiled
in controversy ° since their inception.'" The Federal Judicial Center 2
forcefully urged adoption of the amendments both before the Supreme
Court (the Court promulgated the amendments with three justices
sharply dissenting) 3 and before Congress (the House voted to veto the
See infra note 25.
Symposium Reinventing Civil Litigation: Evaluating Proposals For Change, 59 BROOK.
L. REV. 655 (1993). ("The many judges, academics and practitioners who support
the recent amendments long have criticized the civil litigation system as a failure in
need of drastic reform, branding it costly, slow and ineffective. But others see the
amendments as yet another instance in a growing trend to reduce access to the federal
courts, particularly for the disenfranchised, who arguably face the greatest need for
access.")
" See infra Part IV.
An objective description of the disclosure amendments might well be "incre-
mental" or "a first step" or "barely non-trivial." They require the disclosure
of nothing that is not mandatory under the present rules.
Winters, supra note 7, at 271. The conceptual underpinnings of the amendments
emerged in two articles. One was authored by magistrate judge Wayne Brazil, a
member of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, and the other by retired judge
William Schwarzer, now the director of the Federal Judicial Center. See Wayne D.
Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31
VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1348 (1978); William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the
Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Pir. L. REV. 703, 721-23 (.1989)
[hereinafter Schwarzer Rules].
,2 See 28 U.S.C. § 620 (1990) (creating and defining the duties of the Federal
Judicial Center). The Center is currently funded by an appropriation of $17,795,000
and employs a permanent staff of 134 employees. Federal Judicial Center, About the
Federal Judicial Center I (May 1992).
"s Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 507 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas and Souter, JJ).
In particular [the justices] disliked the additional layer of discovery practice
provided by required "disclosure" under new Rule 26. They also saw the
disclosure mechanism as undermining the traditional adversary method of civil
litigation to the extent that it required counsel to do work on behalf of their
opponents. Additionally, the dissenters saw the discovery changes as "prema-
ture" in light of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 .... which requires that
each federal district court craft a Delay and Expense Reduction Plan, thus
endorsing a period of experimentation with discovery that could be thwarted by
nationwide changes in the Rules.
Stempel, Trends, supra note 4, at 680 (discussing trends affecting our understanding of
adjudicatory procedure).
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amendments, the Senate did not14 ).15 The rest of the legal community
joined in almost universal opposition.16 Of the 264 written submissions
to the Judicial Center on the proposed rule amendments, 251 opposed
the amendments. 7 Despite strong and strident opposition, repeated
statements about the proposed amendment's impending demise 8 proved
to be, in Mark Twain's words about his own reported death, "greatly
exaggerated."
In its recent status report the Federal Judicial Center, perhaps
unintentionally, aptly captured the shifting, contingent nature of the
mandatory disclosure amendments.
Rule 26(a)(1)... has been rejected more often than the other disclosure
subsections of the rule .... 52 courts have exempted cases .... of these,
however, sixteen require disclosure through local rules or under the
C.J.R.A. plan, and thirteen specifically give individual judges authority
to require initial disclosure. Cases in thirteen of those courts would also
be exempt from expert and pretrial disclosure.
" Randall Samborn, Rules For Discovery Uncertain, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Dec.
20, 1993, at I (reporting the House veto of the mandatory disclosure amendment via
H.R. 2814 and the Senate's failure to pass a veto resolution). See also Randall Samborn,
A Bill To Stop Change Dies, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Dec. 6, 1993, at 3 (reporting on
the demise in the Senate of a House-approved measure that would have eliminated
the mandatory disclosure provision from amended Rule 26 and placing the blame for
this on 1 1th-hour pressure from plaintiff's and civil rights lawyers who additionally
sought to remove the limits on depositions and interrogatories).
" Stempel, Trends, supra note 4, at 681 (discussing the mechanics of Congressional
action on the rule's amendments).
16 Reinette Cooper Deyfuss, Speech at the 1994 annual meeting of the American
Association of Law School Civil Procedure and Litigation Sections Seminar on Amended
Rule 26. Most judges, the bar, academia, community watchdog groups, the defense
bar, and the civil rights bar were opposed to the changes. There is always some
opposition to rules changes. However, the sheer volume of opposition to the changes
to Rule 26 was unprecedented. Randall Samborn, New Discovery Rules Take Effect,
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Dec. 6, 1993, at 3. But see Winters, supra note 11, at 275
("I did not, and do not, regard the Bar as universally opposed to the proposals.
[I1mportant segments of the organized Bar have little incentive to lessen the cost of
litigation by reducing the need for unnecessary legal services. Those who seek to
reform discovery are, therefore, unlikely to ever find their proposals commanding
enthusiastic support among the organized Bar.").
11 Alfred W. Cortese and Kathleen L. Blaner, A Change In the Rules Draws Fire,
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Oct. 18 1993, at 25.
" Winters, supra note 11, at 274 ("1 am convinced that discovery reform is doomed
to much organized resistance and little organized support").
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On the other hand-and, again, if current decisions regarding the federal
rule amendments hold and if local disclosure requirements continue in
effect-in two-thirds of the courts parties may face initial disclosure
requirements: 32 courts where the federal rules are fully in effect and
34 courts where the local rules or C.J.R.A. plan require it or the
individual judge may order it.' 9
How have the Federal Rules, the centerpiece of modern federal courts,
reached this apparent state of "primordial ooze?" 20 Why has the multi-
faceted push to reform a troubled civil justice system left the federal
courts and practitioners, at least temporarily, in this suspended state
of ambiguity and uncertainty?2' More questions have been raised than
'9 Federal Judicial Center, Implementation of Disclosure in Federal District Courts with
Specific Attention to Courts' Responses to Selected Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26 (March 1, 1994).
20 United States District Court Judge Norma Shapiro, Speech at the annual meeting
of the American Association of Law Schools Civil Procedure and Litigation Section's
Seminar on Amended Rule 26. Notes and audio on file with authors. See Randall
Samborn, Rules For Discovery Uncertain, supra note 14, at 1.
21 Civil justice reform has taken many forms. Congress created the Federal Courts
Study Committee (FCSC), which issued the Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee
(1990). The FCSC was created pursuant to the Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642., Title I: Federal Courts Study Act,
102 Stat. 4644. The FCSC report analyzed the problems of the federal courts over a
fifteen-month period and proposed detailed recommendations to Congress. Id. at 3.
The FCSC report findings were an instrumental building block in the Congressional
formulation of the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA). The report found that the annual
number of civil and criminal cases filed in the federal district courts since 1958 have
trebled while the annual number of appeals filed in the courts of appeals have increased
more then tenfold. Id. at 5. The FCSC report proposed changes to the civil justice
system that, if adopted, were projected to reduce filings in appellate courts by 16
percent and in district courts by about 37 percent. Id. at 27.
Civil justice reform also emerged on another front. In 1989, Senate Judiciary Chair
Joseph Biden requested that the Brookings Institution and the Foundation for Change
assemble a diverse task force to study the civil justice system. The task force's report,
Justice For All: Reducing Costs and Delays in Civil Litigation, provided another foundational
pillar for the CJRA. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §S 471-482 (Supp. II 1990)). The Civil Justice
Reform Act is Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified in various sections of 28 U.S.C.). See also S. Rep. No.
416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6853;
H.R. REP. NO. 733, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1990). The CJRA requires the ninety-
four federal district courts to assess their dockets in order to promulgate procedures
for decreasing the expense and delay involved in civil lawsuits. Mandatory disclosure
is one of the primary suggested reforms of the CJRA. Grass-roots advisory committees
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answered by mandatory disclosure reforms and each district court's
prerogative to opt-out. May the federal district courts opt-out of some
but not all of the changes in the discovery rules? Was it contemplated
that by opting out of mandatory disclosure without opting out of
deposition-discovery limits, district courts might restrict overall discov-
ery and shift litigation power? How do opt-out orders and the Rule
amendments interface with the litigation reforms mandated by Con-
were created to advise every district court on appropriate procedural reform. See also
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Equal, Accessible, Affordable Justice Under Law: The Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, 1 CORNEL J. LAW. PUB. POL. 1 (1992), but see Linda S. Mullenix,
Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN.
L. REV. 1283 (1993) (hereinafter "Unconstitutional Rulemaking") (criticizing the Civil
Justice Reform Act).
The proposed Access to Justice Act is an extension of former Vice President
Quayle's legal reform effort. The act addresses several areas of federal litigation, most
notably mandatory disclosure and the adoption of the "English rule" on attorneys'
fees (loser pays).
The Bush administration, through a 1991 Executive Order #12778, implemented a
form of civil justice reform within the Executive Branch. The order seeks "reforms in
the methods by which attorneys for the government conduct discovery, seek sanctions,
present witnesses at trial, and attempt to settle cases." See Memo of preliminary
guidance on Implementation of the litigation reforms of Executive Order no. 12778,
57 Fed. Reg. 3640, 3640-41 (1992).
A populist litigation reform movement has also surfaced. See Margalynne Armstrong,
Book Review, Legal Breakdown: 40 Ways to Fix Our Legal System, 32 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 297 (1992). The populist legal movement centers on self-help as a means of
employing "non-attorneys to represent themselves in simple legal matters." Id. at 301.
Populist legal movements have two general goals: "(1) simplifying and improving
access to justice and (2) decreasing the number of attorneys and eliminating barriers
to legal access imposed to protect the financial interests of attorneys." Id. at 301-2.
Within this setting of the Congressional, Executive, and Populist reform movements,
the mandatory disclosure amendments emerged. In 1992 the Advisory Committee and
Federal Judicial Conference proposed, and in 1993 the Supreme Court promulgated
and Congress declined to veto, sweeping amendments to Federal Rules 4 (service), 11
(sanctions), 16 (pretrial conference), 30 (depositions), 33 (interrogatories), and 37
(discovery sanctions). Discovery reform formed the heart of the amendments and Rule
26's mandatory disclosure formed the heart of the reform. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 16,
and 26, 1993 Amendments. Changes to Rule 11 include removing the sanctions for
discovery abuse and placing them within Rule 37. Also, Rule 11 now provides a "safe
harbor" for litigants during which sanctions will not be levied if proper action is
taken.
Rule 16, the pretrial scheduling conference rule, is now linked to the discovery
process. The rule requires that the judge issue a scheduling order and in some instances
hold a conference with representatives of all parties. The changes to the rule allow
the judge expanded powers to control the litigation through the pretrial conference.
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gress' Civil Justice Reform Act-pursuant to which every district court
is to reduce delay and cost by adopting a procedural reform plan and
rules tailored to its needs and priorities?22 To what extent are the
effectiveness of all of these changes contingent upon judges and mag-
istrate judge's commitment to active discovery management? As one
commentator observed, "the [procedural reform] process has been
tortured and the fight is far from over.''23
The recent amendments to Rule 26, mandating disclosure of relevant
information without the need for traditional party-initiated discovery,
are set within a multitude of efforts to remedy the oft-described ills of
the civil justice system. 24 As context for our inquiry into what many
perceive as fundamental changes in the discovery process and, in turn,
lawyer-client relationships, Part II briefly describes the Temporary
"Opt Out" Order of the Hawai'i federal district court. Part III
addresses the mandatory disclosure amendments, their underlying bases
and accompanying criticisms. Part IV describes how that particular
reform emerged and some of the political considerations at play. Part
V offers a glimpse of the future.
II. THE HAWAI'I FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT'S TEMPORARY "OPT-
OUT" ORDER
By Temporary Order dated November 30, 1993," s the Hawai'i
federal district court stepped into an uncertain discovery future by
A related state court question is, should the Hawai'i Supreme Court adopt the
federal mandatory disclosure amendments as part of the state rules of procedure? 28
U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
23 John K. Chapin, Major Changes In The Federal Rules Become Effective, Federal Litigator,
vol. IX, no. 1 (Feb. 1994), at 4. See also, Randall Samborn, Bill to Stop Change Dies,
supra note 14, at 3 (discussing the prospects for Congressional repeal of amended Rule
26).
11 See supra note 21. See also Stempel, supra note 4, at 659 (discussing change within
the adjudicatory system).
23 Temporary Order Regarding Discovery Procedures, Nov. 30, 1993 In The United States
District Court For the District of Hawai'i.
PREAMBLE
On April 22, 1993 the Supreme Court of the United States referred to the
Congress of the United States various proposed amendments to a number of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Until the time Congress adjourned on
November 24, 1993, it was uncertain as to whether Congressional approval
would be given to all, some, or none of the proposed amendments prior to the
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opting-out of some, but not all, 26 of the recently promulgated discovery
effective implementation date of December 1, 1993. Although the United States
House of Representatives passed a bill making some modifications, the United
States Senate adjourned without taking any action. Accordingly, the proposed
amendments will take effect as of December 1, 1993.
Sections (a), (b), (d), and (f) of 26 Fed. R. Civ. P. provide that a district
court may by order or by local rule modify or "opt out" of certain provisions
of Rule 26. It is the opinion of this Court, and supported by recommendations
from the Advisory Group appointed pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act,
that certain of the proposed modifications contained in Rule 26 are neither
desirable nor consistent with the manner of practice in this District. In view of
the uncertainty as to what action, if any, Congress would take as to Rule 26,
and the lack of time for this Court to duly consider the final form of Rule 26
prior to its implementation date of December 1, 1993, it is the decision of this
Court, to the extent of its authority, to maintain the status quo under the
provisions of Rule 26 as they are of this date as supplemented by this District's
Local Rules, and to determine within a reasonable period after December 1,
1993 which provisions, if any, together with such modifications as may be
deemed appropriate, should be adopted by this District by way of amendments
to this District's Civil Justice Reform Act Plan and Local Rules.
TEMPORARY ORDER
Therefore, the Court hereby promulgates the following Temporary Order. IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that this District will "opt out" of the proposed
amendments to Rule 26, to the extent authorized under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (a),
(b), (d), and (f), to the effect that the provisions of Rule 26 as they are of this
date as supplemented by this District's Local Rules and this District's Civil
Justice Reform Act Plan shall remain in full force and effect. All other Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that make reference to Rule 26 shall be construed as
referring to the appropriate section of Rule 26 as it is of this date.
Dated: Honolulu, Hawai'i, this 30th day of November, 1993.
Order Establishing Guidelines For The Application Of The Amendments To The Federal Rules
Of Civil Procedure To Existing Cases, Jan. 10, 1994 In The United States District Court
For The District of Hawai'i.
Effective December 1, 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been
amended substantially. On November 30, 1993, this Court filed a TEMPO-
RARY ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY PROCEDURES which tempo-
rarily "opt-out" of the application in the District of Hawai'i of the new
amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b), (d), and (f). However, this Order
did not negate the effectiveness of the substantial changes to Rules 1, 4, 5, 11,
12, 15, 16, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 50, 52, 53, 54, 58, 71A,
72, 73, 74, 75, and 76 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, did not negate
the adoption of a new Rule 4.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
did not negate the effectiveness of the substantial changes to Rule 26(c)(e) and
(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Order enacting these changes also provides that these amendments shall
govern, "insofar as just and practicable", all proceedings in the civil cases
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amendments.27 The Temporary Order's opt out on the mandatory
disclosure and its "opt-in" on other discovery changes, in cumulative
effect, sharply limit discovery for some, and perhaps many, cases. The
Order leaves in place the amendments to Rules 30 and 33 that limit
depositions to 10 per side and interrogatories to 25 per party including
subparts. Those limitations on formal discovery at the back end were
to be the quid pro quo for the Rule 26 informal disclosure of information
at the front end. Opting out of the Rule 26 front end disclosure while
accepting the Rules 30 and 33 deposition-interrogatory limits may well
shift the balance of litigation power in discovery. On the one hand,
presumptive limits on formal discovery may discourage wasteful dep-
osition and interrogatory practices. On the other hand, plaintiffs may
be prejudiced in multi-party or complex cases where the defendants
possess most of the relevant evidence. 2 For certain types of cases, the
Temporary Order thus may involve regular motions to or conferences
pending on December 1, 1993 and thereafter. This Court is aware it must
provide some guidance to litigants and practitioners concerning how this Court
will apply these amendments to cases filed prior to December 1, 1993.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that (1) all amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure except the discovery amendments (as designated
hereinbelow) shall apply immediately to all civil actions, (2) the amendments to
Rules 26(c), (e), and (g), 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure ("the discovery amendments") shall apply completely
to all pending civil actions in which an initial scheduling conference is held on
or after December 1, 1993 before a Magistrate Judge pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 16, and (3) the discovery amendments shall be applied to other civil actions
already pending on December 1, 1993 only upon order of the Court and only
to the extent ordered by the Court.
Dated: Honolulu, Hawai'i, this 10th day of January, 1994.
26 The Temporary Order does not opt-out of the 1993 amendments to sections c,
e and g of Rule 26, nor does it opt-out of the Rules 30 and 33 limits to depositions
and interrogatories.
27 Authority for the district courts to opt-out lies in FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(1)
(Initial Disclosures): "Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order or
local rule, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request provide to other parties
.... " According to the Advisory Committee, authorization of local variations in
mandatory disclosure "is, in large measure, included in order to accommodate the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 [see infra note ], which implicitly directs districts to
experiment during the study period with differing procedures to reduce the time and
expense of civil litigation." Committee Notes, supra note . The Committee also observed
that disclosure "will not be appropriate for all cases [citing social security reviews and
government collections as examples], and it is expected that changes in these obligations
will be made by the court or parties when the circumstances warrant." Id.
28 See infra Section III.
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with magistrate judges requesting waivers of the deposition-interroga-
tory limits according to as yet undefined criteria.2 9
The Local Rules Committee of the Hawai'i federal district court is
undertaking a thorough evaluation of the court's Temporary Order
and its impact on civil discovery.3 0 Four alternative paths are manifest
at this time: (1) finalize the Temporary Order in its current form,
eliminating mandatory disclosure without altering deposition-interrog-
atory limits and thereby limiting overall discovery; (2) rescind the
Temporary Order, thereby "opting-in" to the Rule 26 mandatory
disclosure amendments with all their attendant problems (discussed in
Section III); (3) issue a new order (or promulgate a local rule) rejecting
the blanket applicability of the Rule 26 mandatory disclosure require-
ments while authorizing judges or magistrate judges to order disclosure
without discovery requests on a case specific basis; 31 or (4) alter the
Temporary Order to reject in entirety the 1993 discovery changes to
Rules 26, 30, 31 and 33, thereby reverting to the pre-amendments'
discovery scheme which provided for judicial control over discovery
through prior Rules 16, 26(b)(1), 26(c), 26(f) and 26(g). These alter-
native paths will be addressed in Part V in light of the discussions in
Parts II, III and IV.
III. RULE 26 AMENDMENTS: FROM DISCOVERY TO DISCLOSURE
This Part describes salient changes to Rule 26 and varying critiques
of those changes.
A. Mandatory Disclosure
Mandatory disclosure is the most striking change to Federal Rule
26.32 Rule 26 now requires the parties to disclose certain "core"
29 FED. R. Civ. P. 30 limits depositions taken without leave of court to 10 per
side, and FED. R. Civ. P. 33 imposes a limit of 25 interrogatories per side including
subparts.
30 Co-author Yamamoto is a member of the Hawai'i federal district court Local
Rules Committee. He was appointed after this article was substantially completed.
"' As this article goes to the press, the Local Rules Committee of the Hawai'i
Federal District Court is recommending to the court that the Temporary Order be
rescinded and that the court's Local Rules be amended to authorize judges or magistrate
judges to order disclosure on a case specific basis.
32 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) provides:
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information without formal discovery requests. The Federal Rules
Advisory Committee conceived of the mandatory disclosure provisions
as the functional equivalent of court ordered interrogatories and doc-
ument production requests. 3 The primary purpose of disclosure is
efficiency-to "accelerate the exchange of basic information about the
case and to eliminate the paper work involved in requesting such
information." '3 4 Its purpose is also to "eliminate certain discovery,
[and] help focus the discovery that it needed." ' 35 According to the
Advisory Committee, the "disclosure requirements should, in short,
be applied with common sense in light of the principles of Rule 1,
keeping in mind the salutary purposes. . . [of] the rule.' '36 SectionB of
(a) Required Disclosures; Methods to Discover Additional Matter.
(1) Initial Disclosures. Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order
or local rule, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other
parties:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each
individual likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts
alleged with particularly in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the infor-
mation;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents,
data compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of
the party that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing
party, making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the
documents or other evidentiary material, not privileged or protected from
disclosure, on which such computation is based, including materials bearing on
the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement
under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to
satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to
indemnify or reimburse for payments made to safisfy the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, these disclosures shall be made
at or within 10 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). A party
shall make its initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably available to
it and is not excused from making its disclosures because it has not fully completed
its investigation of the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of another party's
disclosures or because another party has not made its disclosures.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee Notes in commentory suggesting disclosure
amendments.
" Advisory Committee Notes.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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Part III addresses whether the Rule is likely to satisfy its stated
purposes. The remainder of this section generally describes the disclo-
sures mandated by the amended rules.
1. Initial Disclosures
Witnesses
Section 26(a)(1)(A) of the amended rule requires a party to identify
the name, address and telephone number of those individuals "likely
to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity in the pleadings." 3 7 The party is also required to identify
the type of information these individuals are likely to possess. The
party is required to identity witnesses whether or not their testimony
will be supportive of the disclosing party's position.18
Documents
Section 26(a)(1)(B) requires disclosure of, "a copy of, or a description
by category and location of, all documents, data compilations, and
tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the party that
are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the plead-
ings." 39 The disclosure must produce relevant documents or be of
sufficient specificity to "enable opposing parties (1) to make an in-
formed decision concerning which documents might need to be ex-
amined, at least initially, and (2) to frame their document requests in
a manner likely to avoid squabbles resulting from the wording of the
"1 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(A).
1 Id. All parties who make disclosures and later learn that the disclosure is erroneous
or incomplete are required to supplement their initial disclosure with a corrective
disclosure. Advisory Committee Notes. However, if the target party of the disclosure
has been made aware of the error or incompleteness of a party's disclosure, and has
received the corrective or additional information through other methods, the disclosing
party is not required to supplement. Experts are required to supplement both their
report and any testimony given in a deposition that is either erroneous or incomplete.
Id. This duty to supplement must be carried out before the party's required pretrial
disclosures are made.
19 FED. R. Civ P. 26(a)(l)(B). Disclosure includes "all potentially relevant items
then known to the party whether or not supportive of its contentions in the case."
Advisory Committee Notes.
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requests." 4 Section 26(a)(1)(B) encourages the actual production of
documents, or at the very least, an accurate cataloguing and accounting
of the documents. 4 ' By cataloguing documents the party does not waive
objections based on privilege or work product immunity. 42 The party
also preserves the right to object to the later production of listed
documents on the grounds that the expense and burden of production
is outweighed by the documents' minimal relevance. 4
A party's obligations to disclose witness identities and document
information are linked to the specificity and clarity of the factual
allegations in the pleadings.4 4 Disclosure is limited to information
relevant to "disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings. 45
Section 26(a)(1) envisions two aids to the determination of the appro-
priate scope of disclosure: first, heightened fact pleading by the parties,
and second, the parties' refinement of issues at the Rule 26(f) discovery
plan meeting prior to disclosure." If an opposing party serves a broad
pleading filled with conclusory allegations, and issues and disputed
facts are not specifically identified at the discovery plan meeting, the
responding party need not ascertain all "relevant" possibilities, do
exhaustive research and respond in detail. 4 7
Once relevancy is defined, the Rules contemplate a cooperative
attorney and party inquiry into the party's files. The Advisory Com-
mittee lists factors to aid counsel in delimiting the scope of that inquiry,
including the complexity of the issues, the location, nature and number
and availability of witnesses and documents and the time remaining
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5). The disclosing party must, however, list all protected
documents "otherwise discoverable."
43 Id.
44 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(A). "The greater the specificity and clarity of the
allegations in the pleadings, the more complete should be the listing of potential
witnesses and types of documentary evidence." Advisory Committee Notes.
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
46 Advisory Committee Notes.
41 See Advisory Committee Notes. The defendant is required to disclose only that
material gathered through the preparation of its answer that is relevant to matters
"alleged with particularity" in the complaint. Virginia Hench, Can Mandatory Disclosure
Curb Discovery Abuse? The 1993 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules and the Just, Speedy
and Inexpensive Determination of Every Action, 67 TEMP. L.REv. 401, 420 (1994). "The
defendant is not required to read all of their documents, and may still produce
'properly identified' files as they are maintained in the ordinary course of business in
accordance with the provisions of the pre-1993 rule 33." Id.
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for compliance. 48 Another factor is the "extent of past working rela-
tionships between the attorney and the client particularity in handling
related or similar litigation." ' 49 Attorneys with long-standing client
litigation relationships bear a more extensive duty of inquiry. The
controlling principle overall is that a party should disclose information
"then reasonably available to it. "50
Damages and Insurance
Section 26(a)(1)(C) of the amended Rule requires a claimant to
compute all categories of damages and provide supporting documents. 1
Section 26(a)(2) requires defendants to provide "for inspection and
copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under which any
person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part
or all of a judgment. ' 52 A defendant thus must now reveal not only
the contents of its liability insurance policy, as required under former
Rule 26(b)(2),53 it must also provide the insurance agreement itself.54
Expert Testimony
Section 26(a)(2) significantly alters the discovery treatment of ex-
perts.5 5 The section envisions the elimination of courtroom surprises.
Premised on the notion that an informed party, with a realistic assess-
ment of the likelihood or potential failure of its claims at trial, will be
more likely to settle, the rule mandates early and firm disclosure of an
expert's intended testimony. 56
"6 Advisory Committee Notes.
49 Id.
50 Id.
" "Computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party,
making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other
evidentiary material, not privileged or protected from disclosure, on which such
computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries
suffered." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(C).
11 FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(D).
53 Id.
14 Id. This disclosure does not make the insurance information admissible into
evidence at trial.
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
56 Advisory Committee Notes. "Experts" are defined with reference to Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Advisory Committee Notes.
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The section's most significant provision requires the trial expert to
prepare a formal report prior her now mandated deposition. 7 The
expert's report must detail, (1) opinions, (2) bases for the opinions,
(3) all material "considered""8 by the expert. This report preparation
requirement is significant because it will likely change customary expert
behavior. Attorneys rarely ask an expert to prepare an early report.
Such a report tends to lock the expert into opinions and subject her
to limiting cross-examination. The requirement is also significant be-
cause, as the Advisory Committee Notes indicate, disclosure of all
material "considered" means the expert m-ust disclose attorney work
product given to the experts, including material provided as general
background.
Given this obligation of disclosure, litigants should no longer be able to
argue that materials furnished to their experts to be used in forming
their opinions-whether or not ultimately relied upon by the expert-
are privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure when such persons
are testifying or being deposed.
59
This represents a sharp departure from the prevailing standard which
requires an expert to disclose only documents that impacted upon her
testimony or that she relied upon in forming her opinion. 60 The party
with the burden of proof on an issue must make the initial disclosure
of its expert's report and testimony before other parties are so obli-
gated. 61
51 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
11 Id. This includes any data, treatises or case assessments the witness considered
in forming her opinions. The qualifications of the witness must also be listed, including
a list of all publications authored by the witness within 10 years of the date of the
intended testimony. The witness must also disclose other cases, in the past four years,
in which her testimony was used. Finally, the witness must also disclose the compen-
sation she is receiving for her testimony. Id.
51 Advisory Committee Notes.
60 See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
61 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(2)(B) and Advisory Committee Notes. In addition to the
initial disclosures a party must disclose information in preparation for trial. FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(a)(3). This disclosure includes the identity of each trial witness. Id. A party
must indicate which witness' testimony is to be presented by deposition transcript. Id.
If the deposition was not stenographically recorded, then the party must provide a
transcript of the portions to be used. The party must also categorize its exhibits as to
those it intends to offer into evidence and those it plans to use when necessary. Id.
In the absence of contrary court order, these disclosures are to be made at least 30
days before the trial. Id. Unless the court orders otherwise, a party must object to the
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2. Disclosure Mechanics
Meeting of Parties
Amended Rule 26(f) requires the parties to meet and discuss the
issues in the case with an eye toward early settlement and toward
framing discovery. 62 At this meeting the parties also are directed either
to make the disclosures mandated by the Rule or to arrange for those
disclosures. 63 All parties entering an appearance are required to attend
the meeting in person or through a representative. 64 The parties must
work in good faith towards a mutually-agreed upon disclosure and
discovery plan. 65 A written report outlining the plan must be submitted
to the court within ten days following the meeting. 66 The Advisory
Committee Notes contemplate that the "report will assist the court in
seeing that the timing and scope of disclosures. . .and the limitations
on the extent of discovery under these rules and local rules are tailored
to the circumstances of the particular case. "67
admissibility of the other party's disclosed list of exhibits, and object to the use under
Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated under Rule 26(a)(3)(B), within 14 days after
receiving the required pretrial disclosures. Id. If the party fails to do so, the court will
deem those objections waived in the absence of a good cause showing. Id.
62 Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f). The discovery meeting triggers the deadline for the
mandatory disclosure. Disclosure must be made within 14 days of the meeting. Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
63 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0(l),(2),(3) and (4). This plan is to include any agreed upon
deviations to the scheme of disclosure mandated by the Rule and the time at which
the disclosures are due to the parties. Id. The plan is also to designate those issues
which require discovery and the timetable for discovery. Id. Any changes to the
discovery limitations imposed by the Rule and any additional restrictions the parties
stipulate to impose upon their discovery abilities. Id.
6 Id.
67 Advisory Committee Notes. Former sub-section (f) of Rule 26 created a device
for optional, party-initiated discovery conferences involving attorneys and the judge.
The device was sparingly used. Id. The amendment to section (f) makes the conference,
now called a meeting, mandatory among the parties. The judge does not participate
in that meeting. The meeting must occur before disclosure and before the Rule 16
pretrial scheduling conference/order.
The Advisory Committee Notes state that changes in sub-section (f) do "not signal
any lessening of the importance of judicial supervision. Indeed, there is a greater need
for early judicial involvement to consider the scope and timing of the disclosure
requirements ...and the presumptive limits on discovery." Id. The Committee Notes
contemplate that this early judicial supervision authority and responsibility is "more
properly included in Rule 16, which is being revised to highlight the court's powers
regarding the discovery process." Id.
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The Certification Requirement
Amended Rule 26(g)8 requires that every disclosure be signed by
an attorney, "reminding the parties and counsel of the solemnity of
the obligations imposed.' '69 The signing attorney certifies that disclosure
is complete and correct at the time it is made.70 Counsel and parties
are thereafter required to supplement initial disclosures.7 1 All discovery
requests, responses or objections also must be signed.72 For all papers
signed and filed during discovery, the signatory certifies compliance
with essentially a Rule 11 reasonableness standard.7 3 For Rule 2 6 (g)
violations, the court is authorized to impose an "appropriate sanction"
upon the signing party or attorney.7 4 The sanction may include attor-
neys fees.7
5
3. Limits On Disclosure
Privileged material need not be disclosed. 6 A party claiming a
privilege or work product immunity, however, must explicitly describe
the information withheld.77 The party is required to indicate the basis
of the claimed protection and describe the information withheld in
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(g). The standards set forth in Rule 26(g) remain essentially
the same as in the version of the rule prior to the 1993 amendments.
69 Advisory Committee Notes.
70 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1).
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
72 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)( 2 ). The party is certifying that after reasonable inquiry,
to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief, the response, request,
or objection is:
(A) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (B) not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (C) not unreasonable or
unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery
already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the
issues at stake in the litigation.
Id.
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)( 3 ).
75 Id.
76 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
77 Id.
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detail."' The description must be complete enough for the other parties
to gauge the validity of the claimed privilege or immunity.7 9
B. Criticisms Concerning Gamesmanship, Satellite Litigation, Cost and
Missing the Mark
This section summarizes principal criticisms of the mandatory dis-
closure amendments to Rule 26. These criticisms focus on, gamesman-
ship, satellite litigation, costs, and missing the mark.
Gamesmanship, Satellite Litigation and Cost
Some commentators believe that the Rule 26 mandatory disclosure
scheme is based on a wish and a prayer.8 0 Mandatory disclosure
embodies no incentives and few disincentives for altering the ethical
and economic-driven behavior of attorneys in an adversarial system.8 1
Yet the scheme is premised on just such a behavioral metamorphosis.
According to these commentators, mandatory disclosure, instead of
defusing tensions and equalizing the playing field, will likely fuel
adversary passions and gamesmanship. Experience has demonstrated
that some attorneys in an adversarial system cannot be left to police
themselves.8 2 In the absence of vigorous case management by judges,
blanket mandatory disclosure requirements will likely fail to reform
modern adversarial litigation and may well exacerbate its faults. Satellite
Id. See Advisory Committee Notes.
Id. In addition, parties moving for protective orders must now certify to the
court that they have first made a good faith effort to resolve the discovery dispute
with opposing parties. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The Hawai'i federal district court's
Temporary Order, supra note 25, does not opt-out of this requirement.
80 Hench, supra note 47, at 429. ("Merely requiring disclosure, without a more
effective system of case management, will not eliminate these problems, nor will wishful
thinking about summon[ing] lawyers to the highest decree of professional conduct.")
81 Id.
82 This is not to state broadly that all or even most attorneys are unscrupulous;
rather it is a statement of general perceptions of segments of the public and scholars.
Meade, Discovery Abuse And a Proposed Reform, supra note 99; Schwarzer, supra note 7;
Lawrence M. Frankel, Disclosure in the Federal Courts: A Cure for Discovery Ills? 25 ARIz.
S. L.J., 249; Paul Lowell Haines, Comment, Restraining the Overly Zealous Advocate:
Time For Judicial Intervention, 65 IND. L.J. 445 (1990) (detailing many of the abusive
behaviors of overly zealous attorneys and concluding that attorneys need greater
judicial supervision).
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litigation will likely be an immediate consequence in some cases. 83 The
zealous advocate is likely to exhaust all strategic avenues available to
her client. The Rule's operative standard- requiring disclosure of
material relevant to facts pleaded with particularity-encourages time-
consuming and costly motions for clarification8 4 for parties seeking to
forestall meaningful disclosure.85 According to Professor Virginia Hench,
"[t]he 1993 discovery amendments will provide an obstinate litigant
with fresh new sources of dilatory tactics. . .[leading to] endless rounds
of 'satellite proceedings'." 8 6 From this perspective satellite litigation
alone is likely to undermine any benefits achieved through across-the-
board application of the mandatory disclosure rules.
Commentators thus predict an increase in pretrial costs. Even for
the non-obstinate litigant, costs may well increase. Many conclude that
the only way an attorney and party can safely avoid sanctions under
the mandatory disclosure scheme is wasteful over-disclosure. 7 Over-
disclosure would increase compliance costs as well as protective motions
practice.88
In addition, for some, the Rule 26 amendments attempt to shape
reform with a sledge-hammer rather than a scalpel. Mandatory disclo-
sure blankets all cases. It may work well in some cases. It is unlikely,
however, to work well in all cases. Rule 26 mandates disclosure without
regard to the needs of the particular case, the relationship of the
attorneys involved or the nature of the issues presented. For many
cases, even where attorneys and litigants act in good faith, disclosure
requirements will likely add another layer of disputation/negotiations/
motions to the discovery process, thereby driving up costs. Mandatory
disclosure may work well where parties and attorneys are cooperative
and documents or other information are readily identifiable. 9 Other-
wise, according to critics, mandatory disclosure promises to increase
costs and time for attorneys and their clients.
" See, e.g., Jeffery J. Mayer, Prescribing Cooperation: The Mandatory Pretrial Disclosure
Requirement of Proposed Rules 26 and 37"of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 REV.
LITIG. 77, (1992). See also Hench, supra note 47, at 420.
8 Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 178.
8" Hench, supra note 47, at 420.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 433-34.
u Griffin Bell, Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV.
1 (1992).
" See supra note 181.
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Missing The Mark
Another principal criticism of the Rule 26 mandatory disclosure
amendments is that "automatic disclosure will not correct the dys-
function [within the civil justice discovery system], nor will it somehow
transform the system into a model of cooperation." 90 Mandatory
disclosure misses the mark.9 Replacing "discovery with what amounts
to an honor system of information exchange, is unlikely to reduce
significantly the more prevalent forms of abuse." ' 92 From this perspec-
tive, Rule 26 now attempts to engraft cooperation onto an adversary
system of civil justice without altering the fundamental oppositional
structure of the system.
93
First, the amendments to the Rule adopt an extremely broad rele-
vance standard for triggering mandatory disclosure. "[T]he result of
this vagueness will inevitably be confusion, disagreement, cost, and
delay." 94 As discussed, this in turn will likely heighten attorney games-
manship rather than minimize it. There is a sharp fear expressed that
the overbreadth of the relevancy standard will lead to dramatic problems
especially in complex tort and securities cases. 95
Second, from this perspective, the amendments' hope for a "change
[in] the culture of adversariness ' 96 is based on a wishful view of reality
Bell, Automatic Disclosure in Discovery, supra note 88, at 1. Bell's article, cited by
Justice Scalia in his dissent to the Rule 26 amendments, discusses the resounding
opposition to the amendments, and concludes that "while there might be problems
with the existing system, the Committee's proposal was likely to exacerbate rather
than solve them." Bell, supra note 88, at 1.
91 Hench, supra note 47, at 432 ("Besides adding another layer to the existing
discovery structure, the 1993 amended rules, like their predecessors, leave untouched
(and may even encourage) such common discovery abuses as over-response to legitimate
discovery requests, evasive or misleading responses, frivolous objections to requests for
discovery, and failure to respond, which have frequently been directed by the party
with greater resources against the party with fewer resources").
92 Id.
"' Bell, supra note 12. But see Michael E. Wolfson, Addressing The Adversarial Dilemma
of Civil Discovery, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 17, 64 (1988) (mandatory disclosure is an
"intentional erosion of the adversary process... which promotes fairness, efficiency
and credibility, and thus strengthens the adversary system by confining it to its proper
role of testing the facts and issues at trial").
94 Bell, Automatic Disclosure.
91 Id. Complex cases such as the toxic torts, product liability, patent and securities
class actions present the specter of a virtually unlimited documents disclosure. Id.
96 Bell, supra note 88, at 13; Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 2
(Dec. 1, 1990) (quoting Committee members James Powers, Mariana R. Pfaelzer and
Wayne D. Brazil).
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and a tinge of irony. Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil and former
Federal Judge William Schwarzer, key architects of the Rule 26 changes,
in past articles decried the economic and professional forces encouraging
lawyer overzealousness in discovery. 97 Judge Brazil asserted that reforms
would be ineffectual without a fundamental transformation in the
current business realities of client representation. 98 The mandatory
disclosure amendments, however, leave unaddressed the essential eco-
nomic and professional forces driving much lawyering behavior in
litigation. 99 Indeed, the amendments appear to allow or even foster
sharp practices. "One who does not want to give information is also
doing the interpretation of what has to be given." 100
Amended Rule 26 thus seeks to replace the culture of adversary
discovery with a cooperative informal scheme of disclosure, employing
"appropriate sanctions" to ensure cooperativeness.'0 ' In light of most
judges desire to avoid refereeing discovery disputes, 0 2 this scheme
appears to rely on a flimsy stick. Without strong incentives or disin-
centives, "the misuse and overuse [of discovery devices would] continue
to represent a viable and, at times, even appropriate expression of a
lawyer's role as a zealous advocate."' 13
In addition to a flimsy stick and the absence of carrots, the Rule's
hope for cooperativeness is seemingly undermined by the limiting
9 Brazil, supra note 11, and Schwarzer, supra note 7.
9 Brazil, supra note 11.
'9 See Meade W. Mitchell, Discovery Abuse and a Proposed Reform: Mandatory Disclosure,
62 Miss. L. J. 743, 746-7 (1993) (listing the forms of discovery abuse and many of
the motivations for such abusive attorney behavior). See also Schwarzer, supra note 7,
(strongly advocating the replacement of discovery with mandatory disclosure to remedy
discovery abuse). Judge Schwarzer defines discovery abuse as the use of discovery "as
a weapon to burden, discourage or exhaust the opponent, rather than to obtain needed
information." Id.
" Stephen Subrin, Panel Presentation on Amended Rule 26, Annual meeting of
the American Association of Law Schools Civil Procedure and Litigation Sections
(January 1994) (tapes on file with authors). Professor Subrin also points out that
procedural reformers have blind spots. They have a tendency not to listen to criticisms
of others regarding the rough edges of their reforms. These blindspots are due in part
to the zeal and steadfastness present in all procedural reformers. The reformers also
tend to become adversaries with those who disagree with the reforms. Id.
Advisory Committee Notes.
02 See Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Frontlines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About
the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 219, 246 (explaining the view
of many attorneys that judges dislike ruling on discovery disputes).
"03 Wolfson, supra note 93. The sanctioning scheme, however, is vaguely defined
and appears to provide little concrete encouragement of cooperativeness.
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structure of the amendments. What is the likely effectiveness, com-
menta-tors ask, of an attempt to supplant one early portion of the
adversary process with a cooperative ethic when the rest of the litigation
process is untouched? Can a "lawsuit be squeezed of its adversariness
during [one phase ofil pretrial preparation and then be allowed to run
at full adversarial throttle during [other phases and at] trial?' 10 4
C. Criticisms Concerning a Revival of Fact Pleading and Diminished Court
Access
The Advisory Committee modified the operative language of Rule
26(a) several times, settling on "material relevant to disputed facts
alleged with particularity." What "particularity" means is still unclear.
The Advisory Committee's suggestion of a sliding scale definition has
failed to clarify the concept.10
5
In addition to problems of vagueness, the particularity requirement
is perceived by many as a back door attempt to revive fact pleading.
The Federal Rules and the United States Supreme Court have explicitly
rejected fact pleading in favor of notice pleading. 0 6 The 1993 amend-
ments to Rule 11 also specifically endorse generalized notice pleading,
allowing parties to plead on information and belief even without
particularized factual support provided that discovery is likely to reveal
supporting evidence. 07 Some commentators are concerned about po-
tentially deleterious effects of an indirect revival of fact pleading.
Heightened fact pleading thresholds tend to discourage court access for
individual plaintiffs suing institutional defendants and for resource-poor
claimants. 1 0
8
104 Id.
105 See Hench, supra note 47, at 429 (discussing the continuing problems surrounding
the particularity standard).
106 See FED. R. Csv. P. 8(a) (notice pleading); FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring
pleading with particularity for claims of fraud or mistake). See Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993)
(rejecting fact pleading in section 1983 civil rights complaints against municipalities
and reaffirming the liberal notice pleading).
107 FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
100 See Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat To The Value of Accessible Courts For
Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.REv. 341 (Summer 1990). See infra Section III C
for a discussion on procedural reform impacts upon court access.
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Mandatory disclosure may likely impact negatively upon those most
in need of ready access to courts. 0 9 One "reason for the severe flaws
in the 1993 amendments is that they rest on the myth that procedural
rules are neutral, i.e., that they transcend the subsiantive law of any
given case, affecting all litigants equally.""10 Professor Hench expresses
concern about the, "effect of the rule makers' efforts [in denying]
plaintiffs effective access to the courts by cutting them off from the
discovery needed to prove, for example, a defendant's knowledge of a
product's danger, or discriminatory intent or discriminatory practices
in civil rights cases.""' Although both plaintiffs" 2 and defendants" 3
lobbying groups opposed the amendments, individual plaintiffs may
stand to lose the most. This is because plaintiffs often start from a
disadvantaged informational position and a sharp reduction in infor-
09 Hench, supra note 47, at 421-22.
The most serious problem with the 1993 amendments is that even if they were
to promote efficiency in 'disposing of' cases, efficiency, in and of itself, does
not assure fairness for all litigants, and does not ensure that public interest and
minority interests will be treated equally with the interests of more mainstream
and powerful litigants. Judge Schwarzer dismisses this concern, arguing that
traditional discovery is unnecessary and can be dispensed with in favor of
mandatory disclosure because "[p]arties have available to them a range of
investigatory resources and techniques which should be utilized before the
burdens of adversary discovery are imposed upon the courts and parties."
This is of course, theoretically true, but this argument is overly simplistic in
that it ignores the realities of cases between parties with grossly unequal financial
and informational resources.
See Yamamoto, supra note 108 (describing the efficiency trend in procedural reform
and its effects of diminishing court access for minorities).
'1 See also Yamamoto, supra note 108, at 397 (discussing developments in procedural
theory that challenge the notion of the inherent neutrality of procedure). Cf Richard
L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L.
REv. 761 (1993) (arguing that we should continue to endorse the pursuit of a neutralist
rulemaking process).
.. Hench, supra note 47, at 10 ("The amended discovery rules will have the effect,
whether intended or not, of advancing a conservative agenda by sharply limiting the
ability of non-institutional litigants to protect their rights in court").
12 The American Trial Lawyers Association (an organization representing the
plaintiff's personal injury bar) objected to the Rule 26 amendments stating, "[T]he
proposed 'voluntary disclosure' will not reduce the cost of litigation . . . , it is difficult
to see how this proposal will reduce the cost of litigation." Bell, supra note 88, n. 111.
"' "On the other side of the aisle, the American Corporate Counsel Association
also criticized the rule as 'unworkable' for corporate defendants." Bell, supra note 88,
n. 111 (listing 61 corporations submitting individual comments in opposition to
amending Rule 26(a)(1)). Winters, supra note 7, at 267, n. 6.
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mational access at the outset cannot be easily compensated for later.
Mandatory disclosure functions under the assumption of equality of
litigation power among the parties. 14 Numerous inequalities exist,
however, among parties to litigation. An information poor plaintiff
under the new discovery scheme depends upon the defendant to provide
harmful information through good faith disclosure." 5 From this per-
spective, the plaintiff's fortunes thus may well turn on the self-interested
defendant's willingness to disclose. If the defendant makes a calculated
decision to risk sanctions and withhold information on the belief that
the plaintiff will therefore be deprived of grounds to compel or seek
further discovery, the plaintiff is caught in a game of "hide the ball."
As the defendant will be reluctant to release damaging information
voluntarily without first being specifically asked for it, the scheme
creates an incentive for the defendant to withhold information and little
disincentive for such behavior. 1 16 Without the information and with
deposition-interrogatory limits to formal discovery, the plaintiff is pre-
cluded from building its case and is much more susceptible to a
defendant's summary judgment motion. Under the new rules "the
party seeking discovery will have to carry a heavy burden of persuasion
in order to justify inquiring further, and will pay severe penalties if it
is less than completely successful."" ' 7 According to Judge Schwarzer,
", Hench, supra note 47, at 421-24.
15 Id. at 423-24. "A plaintiff who has been terminated wrongfully may not know
at the outset whether the reason was age, race, gender, disability, or some other
factor. Before December, 1993, discovery in such a case would frequently disclose
facts supporting valid claims that the plaintiff was unable to plead at the outset because
of lack of documentation. Under the 1993 amendments, however, such a plaintiff will
effectively be barred from obtaining the factual support necessary to amend the
complaint to additional, valid claims that would have been revealed by legitimate
discovery." Id.
16 Hench, supra note 47, at 425-26. Assertions to the contrary, "seem to rest on
several unwarranted assumptions. If a company is, in fact, engaging in illegal discrim-
ination or other tortious conduct, it seems foolish to suppose that it will be ethical in
complying with mandatory disclosure rules, particularly in light of the concurrent
restriction on the plaintiff's right to inquire further through legitimate discovery. Now
that the plaintiff's right to probe these areas is effectively curtailed, defendants will be
able to find out what plaintiff already knows, and then destroy or 'lose' inculpatory
material the existence of which the plaintiff is unaware of with little concern that their
misconduct will come to light. Expecting such a defendant voluntarily to disclose
inculpatory material is as unrealistic as expecting it to contact victims of its past
discrimination and offer reparations without the need for the victims to bring suit."
Id.
17 Hench, supra note 47, at 424; see also Subrin, supra note 100.
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now the director of the Federal Judicial Center, a party should be
allowed additional discovery following disclosure only upon a showing
of "particularized need." '" 8 In this light, it cannot be realistically
presumed that henceforth all tort defendants, for example, will ethically
comply with disclosure requirements where damaging information oth-
erwise would remain hidden. As one attorney expressed it, "we don't
get what's there [now] through discovery. . . . The idea that [defen-
dants] are just going to tell us everything we need to know to win our
lawsuits just doesn't seem very practical." ' ' 9 The mandatory disclosure
amendments appear to disadvantage the information poor plaintiff.
Defendants also have expressed several important, albeit different,
doubts about mandatory disclosure. 20 For those defendants, any di-
minishing of court access for certain plaintiffs groups is offset by likely
adverse impacts on defendants and their attorneys. "Repeat player"
defendants, like plaintiffs, criticize as mistaken the notion that parties
bring "knowledge of relatively equal usefulness at the outset of the
litigation which they can share with their opponents to reduce costs."21
Their concern, however, differs from plaintiffs' concern about lack of
information access. Their concern is that defendants will be doing most
of the heavy disclosing. 2' In addition, some are concerned that the
vagueness of the disclosure standard leaves ethical defense counsel in
a quandary. On the one hand, it appears that over-disclosure is required
to avoid possible rule violations and sanctions." 3 On the other hand,
over-disclosure nullifies the scheme's intended benefits-cheaper quicker
and less burdensome discovery for clients. 2 4 For conscientious defense
counsel, good faith compliance with Rule requirements seems inevitably
to undermine the Rule's purpose.
"' Schwarzer, supra note 7.
'9 American Trial Lawyers of America President Roxanne Barton Conlin, a Des
Moines, Iowa, sole practitioner. Randall Samborn, Derailing the Rules, NATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL, May 24, 1993, at 1. "Mandatory disclosure without unlimited discovery
won't work. We don't think people will fully disclose information that will hurt them
voluntarily unless they know it will be discovered eventually." Arthur H. Bryant,
executive director of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice (a national public-interest law
firm) in opposition to Rule 26, 30, 31, 33 amendments. Id.
"2 See Gerald G. MacDonald Heisiod, Agesilaus and Rule 26: A Proposal for a More
Effective Initial Disclosure Procedure, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 819 (1993) (criticizing the
amendments and proposing an alternative model).
,21 Hench, supra note 47, at 12.
,2 Winters, supra note 7, at 267.
,13 Id. See also Winters, supra note 7, at 267q
"I Hench, supra note 47, at 432-33.
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Perhaps even more significant, defense counsel are concerned about
diminished access to their clients. They worry about the impact of
mandatory disclosure on attorney-client relationships.
D. Criticisms Concerning Impacts On Attorney-Client Relationships
Commentators have said relatively little about the likely impact of
the mandatory disclosure amendments upon key litigation relationships.
One such relationship is the attorney's relationship with her client.
Mandatory disclosure may threaten to undermine the attorney-client
relationship by driving a sharp wedge between an attorney's loyalty to
her client and loyalty to the court. Attorneys are ethically bound to
represent zealously their clients. 125 They are also ethically bound as
officers of the court to serve the interests of fairness and justice. A
balancing is required. The Rule 26 mandatory disclosure amendments,
however, may place attorneys in situations where they are unable to
fulfill either obligation. 26 The defense attorney, in particular, at critical
junctures appears to be required to advocate against her client's in-
terest. 127
The scenario unfolds in this way. The attorney is obligated by
amended Rule 26(a) to demand that her client disclose extremely
sensitive and damaging information to an opponent, even though the
opponent knows nothing about the information and did not specifically
request it, and even though the information may subject the client to
compensatory and punitive damages. The client understandably will
strongly resist that demand. The information is highly damaging to
the client's position and may not otherwise be discovered. Or it may
be information that would only be discovered after expensive and time-
consuming discovery by the opponent-the mere prospect of which
might impel a favorable settlement without production of the infor-
mation. It is unrealistic to assume that the client will be amenable to
its attorney's disclosure justification cast in terms of judicial efficiency
121 Canon 7 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a
lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law." Model Code
of Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1980).
2'6 Hench, supra note 47, ("The 1993 amendments will put ethical defense attorneys
into an intolerable dilemma by forcing them to use their professional skills to help the
opposition").
127 Winters, supra note 7, at 267.
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and overall systemic fairness. 128 From the client's perspective, the client
is paying the attorney to further the client's interests, not to aid its
opponent.129 A client may thus be tempted to say, "Do what we say
or we'll get another attorney." What are the attorney's ethical and
practical options at that juncture? For these reasons, many opposed to
the Rule 26 amendments believe that mandatory disclosure conflicts
with the realistic culture of the practicing bar concerning (1) the zealous
representation of clients, and (2) the economic reality of client demands
on attorney behavior.13 ° One defense counsel expressed his worry in
the following fashion:
I still have a problem that perhaps is just my problem endemic to
defense lawyers. But I have a problem that I am supposed to give up
what I am supposed to disclose to my adversary, and that just really
seems to be contrary to everything that I have done in my practice....
So don't believe that you, you know, a free for all disclosing-everybody
disclosing at the same time. I think that the plaintiff, by God, has the
burden of proof.'
3 1
Further, even if the attorney demands full disclosure and the client
complies, the attorney may no longer enjoy the close confidences of
the client in the future. The client may find it necessary to screen
what the attorney knows to prevent future "gratuitous" disclosures.
This in turn will hamper the quality of legal service by the mal-
informed attorney and a heightened possibility of later imposed sanc-
tions upon the client. When the client must worry about how much
to tell its attorney or about whether its attorney might in actuality sink
the ship, distrust inevitably is cleaved into the attorney-client relation-
ship.
28 "My client should perceive me as his or her trusted and vigorous advocate and
not some doubtful agent of an officious bureaucracy dedicated to imposing its altruistic
ideal of harmony at the expense of my client's interests." Samuel B. Witt, Statement
at the Public Hearing of the Advisory Committee 75-76 (Feb. 19, 1992) as cited in
Bell, supra note 12, at 175.
129 Bell, supra note 88, at n. 176 ("Such a mandatory disclosure system threatens
to interfere in the relationship between attorney and client by requiring an attorney
to make disclosures based upon her assessment of the bases of her opponent's case").
I" The economic and professional factors that magistrate Brazil identified as driving
attorney behavior are still present and conflict with assumptions of cooperation that
the rule now embraces. Brazil, supra note. 11.
"' Statement ofJames Bianchi; Record of Public Hearing of the Advisory Committee
at 48-49 (Nov. 21, 1991) (cited in Bell, supra note 12, n. 177).
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IV. POLITICS OF PROCEDURAL REFORM: THE RULE 26 PHOENIX
Mandatory disclosure truly is the phoenix of federal rules reform.
In light of the criticisms described in Part III, many viewed the rule
as all but dead during several stages of the rulemaking process.
Mandatory disclosure, however, is the reform that would not "go
quietly into the good night. 1 3 2 Given the almost universal opposition
to the Rule 26 amendments, how did the amendments emerge from
the Federal Judicial Conference and Supreme Court, and how did
Congressional veto efforts fail to derail them? "I
A broad societal view is needed. The mandatory disclosure amend-
ments to Rule 26 emerged in the larger context of litigation reform
movements set in motion by the remarks of former Chief Justice
Warren Burger and Harvard president Derrick Bok. Each "strongly
and repeatedly attacked the U.S. legal profession and the role of
litigation in our society. Their remarks and those of other influential
commentators portray lawyers as distrusted and lawsuits as social
pathology.' ' 3 4 The passions of the populace were stirred more recently
by the Quayle Commission on Competitiveness. Former Vice President
Quayle spoke publicly of a litigation explosion and the overwhelming
costs of civil litigation.13 5 These passions, along with Brookings Institute
and Federal Judicial Center studies, 13 6 fueled a juggernaut of litigation
112 Randall Samborn, New Discovery Rules Take Effect , supra note 16. In Feb. 1992
the Advisory Committee-, faced with strong opposition to the proposed mandatory
disclosure changes, withdrew the proposal. Instead of shelving the idea, the Advisory
Committee at Judge Ralph K. Winters' urging authored a modified version of the
rule, catching significant portion of the legal community unaware. Id.
"I Id. Professor Stempel states that: "[d]espite its ease of passage in the House, the
bill was not voted upon in the Senate due to the objections of Senator Howard
Metzenbaum, who refused to let the bill be considered by unanimous consent prior
to the holiday recess. Consequently, the new civil rules took effect December 1, 1993,
as promulgated by the Supreme Court." Stempel, supra note 24, at 681.
,14 Theodore Tetzlaff, Federal Courts, Their Rules and Their Roles, 18 LITIG. 1, 68
(Spring 1991); Eric K. Yamamoto, Case Management and the Hawai'i Courts: The Evolving
Role of the Managerial Judge, 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 395, 397 (1987) (discussing former
Chief Justice Burger's perception of a litigation explosion). See supra note 21. Marcus,
supra note 110, at 762 (describing the ostensible litigation boom image and "the related
notion that lawyers are the cause of many, if not most, of America's woes").
115 See Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on
Competitiveness's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244 (1992) (describing the
litigation reform movement and illustrating the fraility of the statistical underpinnings
relied on by many reformers); Stempel, supra note 24, at 687-88.
316 See supra note 21.
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reform. The question often seemed to be not whether reform would
occur but by whom and in what form? 1" Proponents of mandatory
disclosure reform occupied the rhetorical high ground, employing terms
of "professionalism," "cost and delay reduction," and "active case
management."' 38 They also cast opponents onto the rhetorical low
ground in describing the present state of discovery in employing terms
of "over litigation," "wastefulness," and "abuse".19
The Rule 26 amendment process can be viewed from several per-
spectives. From one vantage point, litigation issues have become in-
creasingly and potentially destructively politicized.' People and
institutions affected by the litigation process translate their personalized
political agendas into global policies for reform that further their
particular interests. The "reality appears to be that many in the legal
community fear that any change comes with a malign hidden agenda'14
because "people are approaching proposed reforms primarily in terms
' As Professor Marcus observes, "the crisis .... relates to control over innovation
and, more specifically, the rules for handling litigation. There is an intrinsic and
unresolved tension about where the power to make procedural rules should rest."
Marcus, supra note 110, at 764.
138 Id.
19 Schwarzer, supra note 7.
"4 Stempel, supra note 24, at 662. There has been an increase in "ad hoc activity
[from] various interest groups, including the bench and the organized bar, primarily
pursued through the official organizations such as the Judicial Conference, the Federal
Judicial Center, the American Bar Association, and the American Law Institute.
Traditionally, of course, judges and lawyers have lobbied Congress and state legislatures
for litigation change, as demonstrated by the saga of the Rules Enabling Act. But,
the legal profession's more recent 'political' activity regarding litigation reform differs
from the traditional model." Id See also Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra
note 21.
[Tihe profession has become more chronically active and more "political" in
its activity. The more developed general and special interest bar groups provide
their members with tools that encourage and enhance their political activity:
publications, newsletters, lobbyists, researchers, hot lines, form letters, fundrais-
ers, PACS and other trappings of the institutionalized political participant.
Across the spectrum of interests ranging from the American Tort Reform
Association (a manufacturers group seeking more favorable product liability
laws) to the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (a liberal group seeking to
protect or expand civil rights laws), America's political actors have increasingly
become involved in matters of litigation procedure.
Stempel, supra note 24, at 668-9.
. Marcus, supra note 110, at 811.
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of whether they will be winners or losers." 1 4 1 The judiciary too has
become more politicized. The "modern, more institutionalized judiciary
displays both greater capacity to generate litigation proposals and
increased ability to react to the initiatives of others.''' 43 Business,
concerned about economic impacts, also has increasingly participated
in the politics of litigation reform.'" ,
The reform process itself has opened to the public14 5 and "the
individuals and organizations providing input into the law reform
process have become more diverse.' ' 46 Increased participation in the
reform process reflects an understanding by many that systemic change
implicates political agendas. 47 As Professor Stephen Burbank observes,
141 Id. at 810. See Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75
JUDICATURE 161, (1991) ("if the interests of the National Association of Process Servers
can alter or supplant the rules process, what self-interested mischief could more powerful
and wealthier political players accomplish?).
'4 Stempel, supra note 24, at 662 ("A relatively small number of 'insider' judges
., seem to exert great influence, through their appointment to important positions
in the judicial establishment, but also because of prestigious reputations or sustained
activity in litigation reform").
'4 Economic forces have served to drive the pace and shape of litigation policy over
the years. "More than in the sciences .... the paradigm shift in procedure was
affected in large part by the sociology and politics of the American judicial system.
Despite its origin in elite efforts to pacify the masses, the open procedural paradigm
became hugely unpopular with the business community, which saw itself victimized
by bogus or marginal claims that consumed legal resources and actually could succeed
at the hands of lay jurors, who elites thought inflated the value of legitimate claims."
Stempel, supra note 24, at 718.
,41 Id. at 666 ("Rules Advisory Committee hearings are open to the public unless
the Committee specifically enters an executive session. Upon request, the Judicial
Conference routinely provides the names, addresses and phone numbers of Committee
members, who can be contacted directly by persons wishing to make a case for or
against change.") But see Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance And Procedural Law Reform: A
Call For A Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 853 (1993)(disagreeing with Professor
Stempel's depiction of the legal community's participation in decision making about
the Federal Rules).
14 Id. at 667.
" "In recent years the political pendulum has swung in the other direction, towards
the 'haves' and away from the 'have-nots.' We have witnessed a backlash against
many equalizing developments in the substantive law. The public may discover too
late that many of its cherished legal rights have become devalued for lack of any
means to redeem them." Senior Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a
Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 828 (1993) (discussing
an alternative view of litigation reform).
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reformers must be "candid in identifying policy choices and clear about
the allocation of power to make them.'
4 8
From another vantage point, the judicial rulemaking process is
perceived to have survived interest-group politics. From this vantage
point, the adoption of the mandatory disclosure amendments became
integrally linked to political worries about judicial autonomy over procedural
rulemaking.149 The Federal Rules Advisory Committee and Judicial
Conference faced a threat of usurpation of their rulemaking authority
by Congress and grass-roots rule makers under the Congressional
Justice Reform Act 50 and by other partisan political lobbying groups.15 '
Federal District Judge William Bertlesman encapsulated the concern,
stating that "the incentive to get [the mandatory disclosure rule amend-
ment] started... [was] the passage of the Biden Bill, when it looked as
though the Judiciary was going to lose control of itself.' '15  Professor
Linda Mullenix perceived recent Congressional action as a debilitating
incursion on the judiciary's inherent power to promulgate procedural
rules.' 1 15  Members of the Advisory Committee and Federal Judicial
148 Burbank, supra note 145, at 850 (calling for a cessation of Congressional action
in the arena of litigation reform). But see Marcus, supra note 110, at 820 ("[t]here is
a good deal of fear and loathing out there on the reform trail. The political critique
contributes to this attitude, of course, by suggesting that there is a malign agenda,
hidden or overt, lurking behind the scenes, which taints even the most benevolent-
appearing reforms").
119 Professor Jeffrey Stempel observes that judicial autonomy in rulemaking has
withered. "A second, more coherent effort to classify recent events as a reform
revolution would argue that Congress has now supplanted the judiciary and that the
Rules Enabling Act's model (perhaps the Act itself) faces numbered days. The reaction
of Congress to newly promulgated Rules changes concerning the controversial Rule
11, discovery and disclosure amendments indicate that this type of paradigm is possible
but not yet able to displace the old model. Congress was heavily involved in almost
revising or stopping the proposed amendments, suggesting that the old paradigm is
wounded and on the run, and that a possible long-term shift to Congress may be in
progress." Stempel, supra note 24, at 735. See also, Marcus, supra note 110.
150 Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Equal, Accessible, Affordable Justice Under Law: The Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, 1 CORNELL J. PUB. POIL. 1 (1992) (describing and justifying CJRA).
See Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulenaking, supra note 21 (CJRA not only
drastically and unwisely alters the traditional rulemaking, but violates separation of
powers norms as well).
,51 Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 21 (describing the pressures faced
by the Advisory Committee).
152 Marcus, supra note 110, at 808-9, n. 199.
'51 Linda S. Mullenix, Should Congress Decide Civil Rules? No: Not a Subject To Wheel'n
Deal, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, November 22, 1993, at 15-16. But see Alfred W. Cortese
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Conference evinced deep concern about the agent of procedural change. ,14
Who had the authority, expertise and methodology for responding
responsibly to the chaotic demands for change voiced by all three
branches of government and the public? 55 If the judiciary backed down
on Rule 26-its most significant proposed litigation reform, a reform
Congress and the Quayle Commission both recommended-the judi-
ciary might well be viewed as abandoning serious litigation reform
while ignoring public outcry. If the judicial branch did not appear to
be responsive and in control, others would step in. At stake, from this
perspective, were not only discovery reform but also judicial legitimacy
in rulemaking. 156
Mandatory disclosure opponents prevailed in the House with the
passage of the "veto bill" House Resolution 2814.15 Their collective
opposition, however, fractured during heavy lobbying in the Senate.15 8
Court reporters succeeded in getting one section of Rule 26 changed
to omit the cost-cutting video deposition provision.159 According to one
report, this launched a partisan free for all with various interest groups
attempting to surgically excise offending portions of any amended
rule. 160 With multiple competing mini-veto proposals, the playing field
Jr. and Kathleen L. Blaner, Should Congress Decide Civil Rules?, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL,
Nov. 22, 1993, at 15. Cortese and Blaner argue that the "disclosure experience"
demonstrates the benefits of public and Congressional input into the rule-making
process.
54 See Mullenix, Hope over Experience, supra note 7.
"' The Advisory Committee's procedures also came under fire. Professor Laurens
Walker proposed an Executive Order that the Advisory Committee must:
(1) make rules based on adequate information;
(2) refrain from rulemaking unless the "potential benefits to society outweigh
the potential costs;"
(3) "pursue objectives chosen to maximize the net benefits to society;"
(4) "choose the alternative involving the least cost to society;" and
(5) attempt to maximize net social benefit in its rules policy.
Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WAS. L.
REV. 455, 466-68 (1993).
156 See Mullenix, Hope over Experience, supra note 7.
' No Mandatory Disclosure, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1993, at 6 (House
Judiciary Committee approves bill, H.R. 2814 deleting the controversial mandatory
disclosure provision from the pending amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure). See Civil Rules Get Nod, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Nov. 15, 1993, at 6
(reporting the House of Representative's approval of H.R. 2814 deleting proposed
Rule 26(a)(1)).
58 Samborn, Bill to Stop Change Dies, supra note 14.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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muddied. No unified, coherent voice emerged to oppose the Rule 26
changes.'6 1 The opposition's uncertainty and inconsistency reportedly
emboldened steadfast proponents of the amendments, principally the
Federal Judicial Conference, and provided space for the Senate's
inaction on the veto bill.' 62
In the aftermath" of the Congressional non-veto of the Rule 26
amendments, the American Bar Association distributed a now infamous
memo.' 63 The memo essentially asserted that while a skirmish was lost
in Congress the battle itself still raged. The veto war could be won on
the federal district court level, the memo said, by lobbying each district
court to employ the opt-out provisions of amended Rule 26. As
discussed earlier, many district courts responded by opting out of all
or some of the Rule 26 mandatory disclosure changes.' 64
District by district opting-out, however, created procedural dis-
uniformity nationally. '6  It also apparently created litigation power
imbalances in district courts that opted out of some but not all of the
discovery changes.' 66 In addition, the process of opting-out (or opting-
in) by local district court rules, raised new potentially serious political-
legal issues. Bill Lann Lee, attorney for the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense Fund, recently
observed that the defense bar tends to control local rule changes. 167 In
most district courts, he indicated, defense attorneys are the ones with
the time to lobby or to sit on local rules committees.' 68 Lee's blanket
observations are certainly debatable. Implicit in his statement, however,
is an important concern about whether current local rulemaking has
161 Id. Some groups worried that the Senate would not go far enough; i.e., cutting
mandatory disclosure but keeping the limits on depositions and interrogatories. Civil
Rights groups worried the Senate might perhaps go too far and also veto the amended
Rule 11 which they found as a desirable change. Id.
162 Id.
163 Panel Discussion on Amended Rule 26, Annual Meeting of the American
Association of Law Schools Civil Procedure and Litigation Sections (January 1994)
(discussing ABA memorandum) (tape on file with authors).
64 Temporary Order, supra note 25. The Hawai'i federal district court has chosen
this route through a local order filed November 30 1993, opting out of the new rule
26 sections (a), (b), (d), and (f). It should be noted that this "opting out" is only
temporary.
65 See supra note 19.
166 Id.
67 Bill Lann Lee, Panel Discussion on Amended Rule 26, Annual Meeting of
American Association of Law Schools Civil Procedure on Sections (January 1994).
168 Id.
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provided any particular litigation interest group an opportunity to shift
favorably the balance of power in discovery.
Partial opt-out orders, such as the Hawaii's Federal district court's
Temporary Order, eliminate mandatory disclosure but leave in place
new limits on depositions and interrogatories. The combined effect is
presumptively to limit formal discovery (depositions and interrogatories)
while not requiring the informal disclosure of core information. 69 This
represents an overall narrowing of discovery. Where one party controls
most of the relevant information-more often a defendant than a
plaintiff-this narrowing of discovery will likely work to that party's
benefit and to the other party's detriment. Might such a district court
order, or local rule, narrowing discovery, generally be characterized as
pro-defendant? On the other hand, blanket mandatory disclosure might
drive a wedge between ethical defense counsel and their institutional
clients, practically benefitting plaintiffs. Might such an order, or rule,
be characterized as pro-plaintiff?
Whatever course district courts pursue via local rules, opportunities
for political leveraging are apparent. Balancing concerns about discov-
ery and litigation power among varying kinds of plaintiffs and defen-
dants, individual and institutional litigants, private claimants and
government, represented and pro se parties, is essential. It is also a
challenging task. Neither the perception of any section of the bar
exerting excessive influence over procedural rule formulation nor the
perception of judicial efficiency overriding fairness to litigants would
bode well for the legitimacy of the civil justice system.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: A GLIMPSE OF THE FUTURE
Paths to the future emerge from the present. As discussed, confusion
and national dis-uniformity mark the present state of Federal Rule 26
and mandatory disclosure.'7 0 The mandatory disclosure amendments
can be fairly viewed as the federal judiciary's primary response to loud
calls for systemic litigation change.' 7 ' Those calls have emanated from
69 Samborn, Bill to Stop Change Dies, supra note 14 ("The House took out one part
of the balance and left the other part in[.] [This] restricted the traditional means that
plaintiffs have of getting discovery and eliminated entirely a new means that was
recommended. That made the House bill very unfair to plaintiffs. If we have to have
limits, we would rather have limits with mandatory disclosure to offset the effect of
the limits").
170 See supra Part II.
'7 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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widely varying sources, sources that can be collectively characterized
as multi-faceted, procedural reform movements. Congress is imple-
menting its own litigation reform agenda through the Civil Justice
Reform Act.'72 Private businesses, through the Quayle Commission on
Competitiveness, have advanced a package of federal litigation reforms
to take law "off of the backs" of business.173 Populists and neighborhood
justice centers advocate bypassing court systems altogether and focus
on community-centered mediation and arbitration. State courts such
as Hawaii's continue to innovate, among other things, establishing far-
reaching alternative dispute resolution programs. 7 4
The politics of procedural reform thus provides context for viewing
the mandatory disclosure amendments. "Who should control procedural
reform" became a significant underlying question for many. Despite
almost universal opposition by all segments of the national bar, 1 5 a
persistent Advisory Committee and Federal Judicial Conference suc-
cessfully steered the Rule 26 amendments through the political shoals,
including the Supreme Court'7 6 and Congress. The amendments be-
came effective on December 1, 1993.
Rule 26's opt-out safety valve, however, opened the door for local
lobbying'77 and enabled 52 of the 94 federal district courts to exempt
themselves, in varying permutations, with varying degrees of perma-
nence, from mandatory disclosure requirements. This present state of
,72 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
73 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
114 HAW. CIR. CT. R. C. A. A. P. (Hawai'i Circuit Court Rules, Mandatory Court
Annexed Arbitration Program).
'5 See supra Part IIIB and C.
76 A Supreme Court majority appeared minimally to scrutinize the proffered rule
amendments. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist's normally blase transmittal letter is
pregnant with material for discussion. In adopting the amendments, he wrote: While
the Court is satisfied that the required procedures have been observed, this transmittal
does not necessarily indicate that the Court itself would have proposed these amend-
ments in the form submitted.
The transmittal letter suggests a highly deferential standard of review for proposed
amendments received from the Judicial Conference.
In light of the language of the Chief Justice's. . . , letter, the most likely conclusion
is that the Court majority applied a "quick check for corruption" standard of review
that focused only on fairness of process rather than a "rational relationship" standard
of review directed toward the actual merits of the proposed rules changes. Stempel,
supra note 24, at 677-79.
17f See supra note 163 (concerning the American Bar Association memorandum urging
collective political lobbying of individual federal district courts).
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rule ambiguity and dis-uniformity, and the tumultuous procedural
reform process leading to it, are what federal district judge Norma
Shapiro recently characterized as the "primordial ooze.'
178
What paths lead from this state of ooze? As mentioned in Part II,
for federal district courts such as Hawaii's which have temporarily
opted out of some of mandatory disclosure package of amendments, at
least four paths emerge: (1) finalize the Temporary Order in its current
form, eliminating mandatory disclosure without altering deposition-
interrogatory limits and thereby limiting overall discovery; (2) rescind
the Temporary Order, thereby "opting-in" to the Rule 26 mandatory
disclosure amendments with all their attendant problems (discussed in
Section III); (3) issue a new order (or promulgate a local rule) rejecting
the blanket applicability of the Rule 26 mandatory disclosure require-
ments while authorizing judges or magistrate judges to order disclosure
without discovery requests on a case specific basis; or (4) alter the
Temporary Order to reject the Rules 26, 30, 31 and 33 discovery
changes in entirety, thereby reverting to the pre-amendments' discovery
scheme which provided for judicial control over discovery through
Rules 16, 26(b)(1), 26(c), 26(f) and 26(g).
How should rule reformers assess these alternative paths? Given the
absence of encompassing empirical studies, most commentary concern-
ing the likely impact of mandatory disclosure has a best "guesstimate"
or reasoned speculation flavor to it. No one can predict the Rule 26
future with reasonable certainty, and speculation about possible impacts
varies widely. Much of the evaluative difficulty lies in an unstated
assumption embodied in the amended rule itself and much of the
diffuse commentary about the rule. That assumption is that mandatory
disclosure requirements must be applied in all civil cases. That as-
sumption leads to the evaluative question around which much of the
current Rule 26 debate has focused: can the mandatory disclosure
amendments be fairly applied to all cases to reduce cost and delay?
Proponents tend to make broad-based statements about mandatory
disclosure's over-all systemic benefits and cite "ordinary" case examples
or hypotheticals for support. 17 9 Opponents tend to highlight specific
types of cases in which mandatory disclosure is likely to create an
imbalance of litigation power among parties, generate wasteful strategic
maneuvering and strain attorney-client relationships. 80
78 See supra note 20.
', See supra Part IIIA.
80 See supra Part ILIB and C.
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As one means for breaking the evaluative log-jam, we challenge the
assumption of the necessary blanket applicability of mandatory disclo-
sure. We believe that the disclosure amendments can be evaluated by
individual federal district courts by asking two questions that assume
the potential appropriateness of mandatory disclosure in some types of
cases but not others. The first question is, "In what types of cases is
mandatory disclosure likely to lead fairly to the reduction of cost and
delay?" The corollary question is, "How can rules be fashioned to
facilitate mandatory disclosure in those types of cases while allowing
for more appropriate methods of discovery in other types of cases?"
Asking those two questions provides a preliminary method for as-
sessing the four paths described above. If the first question is answerable
in the negative-there are no categories of cases in which mandatory
disclosure is workable-then the only paths warranting further inquiry
are path one (finalizing the Temporary "Opt-out" Order) or path 4
(reverting to pre-1993 discovery).
If, however, as we believe, the first question is answerable in the
affirmative-mandatory disclosure can work effectively and fairly in
some types of cases-then there would be no need to preclude man-
datory disclosure for all cases. Finalization of the Hawaii district court's
Temporary "Opt-out" Order would appear unwise. In addition, fi-
nalizing the Temporary order might cement into place a structural
imbalance of litigation power in light of its limitation on formal
discovery without informal disclosure. Thus path one, described above,
appears uninviting.
Path two would be similarly problematic. In light of the voluminous
and vociferous criticism, discussed in Part III, opting-in for blanket
mandatory disclosure would appear unwise absent unequivocal empir-
ical information about its across-the-board efficacy.
In light of an affirmative response to the first question, path three
holds promise. Authorizing magistrate judges selectively to order dis-
closure on a case specific basis, according to pre-defined criteria,
warrants further inquiry. It responds to the second, corollary question-
how can rules be fashioned to mandate disclosure in appropriate cases?
It embodies an implicit point of convergence among supporters and
opponents of blanket mandatory disclosure-that mandatory disclosure
may reduce cost and delay in certain kinds of case situations. If this
is so, and this proposition still needs further verification, then federal
court local rules committees might sensibly do one of two things: (1)
identify specific categories of cases for which disclosure is to be man-
datory (the magistrate judge's task would be to decide whether the
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particular case within a pre-described category); or (2) authorize mag-
istrate judges to exercise discretion ordering disclosure in a particular
case following the Rule 26(f) meeting of the parties and a Rule 16
pretrial conference (the magistrate judge's task would be to evaluate
case specific circumstances according to accepted criteria and determine
whether disclosure is appropriate in that particular case).
We believe that the federal district courts, through their local rules
committees, lack the empirical data and clairvoyance needed to identify
and define in advance workable mandatory disclosure case categories.
This is because key factors for determining workableness, or appropri-
ateness, are interactive. They depend on case specific circumstances.
They are not readily susceptible to pre-defined collective categorization.
Those factors, identified by mandatory disclosure supporters and critics,
include the cooperativeness of both counsel, the locus of needed infor-
mation, the balance of litigation resources and power among parties
and attorneys, the litigation histories of'the parties, the complexity of
issues and the difficulty of determining "relevancy" in light of the
legal theories asserted.
For this reason, and assuming the first question posed above is
answerable affirmatively, we believe that a federal district court could
sensibly adopt a local rule authorizing magistrate judges to assess in
each case the factors described above and order mandatory disclosure
where it is appropriate. 181 This is path three. The factors (or criteria)
would need careful refinement. Magistrate judges would need to be
amenable to greater case management early on. Selective mandatory
disclosure in this fashion might provide a way to reduce cost and delay
fairly in some cases without generating untoward consequences. Thir-
teen federal district courts have now taken this approach.182
18 See Federal Judicial Center Report, supra note 19 (describing 13 district courts
which give judges discretionary power to mandate disclosure). In one case, United
States District Judge George M. Marovich authorized the parties in a case removed
to his court prior to the adoption of the mandatory disclosure amendments to
retroactively adhere to the amendments. Samborn, Rules For Discovery Uncertain, supra
note 14. Judge Marovich noted that "[t]he issues in this lawsuit are few and well-
defined. Similarly discovery should be limited and well focused. As a result, this is a
case tailor-made for application of the amended federal discovery and scheduling
rules. " Id.
82 As this article goes to press, the Hawaii Federal district court Local Rules
Committee is recommending to the court the adoption of a Local Rule that embraces
what we have called "path three"-rejecting blanket mandatory disclosure, as set
forth in Federal Rule 26, and authorizing judges, or magistrate judges, to order
disclosure on a case specific basis.
1994 / DISCLOSURE
What about cases for which mandatory disclosure is deemed inap-
propriate? Local rules could specify that if a judge declines to order
mandatory disclosure the pre-1993 discovery regime applies, as slightly
modified by those 1993 amendments not embracing disclosure. But
would this not encourage, or at least allow, the very discovery abuses
mandatory disclosure attempted, to address? This is a distinct possibility.
We believe, however, that this need not be so. It appears that pre-
1993 discovery management tools were under utilized by most judges.
Pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(1)-Rule 26(b)(2) under the 1993 amendments-
memorialized the concept of proportionality in discovery and authorized
judges to shape and limit discovery at the outset to assure its appro-
priateness to the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
resources of the parties and the public's interest. The pre-1993 Rule
26(f) discovery conference-a "meeting of parties" under the 1993
amendments-and Rule 26(g) discovery sanctions provided vehicles
and muscle for shaping and limiting discovery to avoid problems. The
Rule 16 pretrial conference also conferred upon judges significant
discovery management powers. What appeared to have been lacking
was a collective commitment among judges and attorneys to employ
these rules to facilitate active case management of discovery early on
in difficult cases. The combined powers and vehicles established by
these rules provide a largely under utilized and potentially viable
approach to discovery control in non-mandatory disclosure cases. The
key, of course, is commitment by judges, magistrate judges and attor-
neys to early and active discovery management.
Thus, in our preliminary estimation, path three, as it draws upon
part of path four-authorizing judges to order implementation of
mandatory disclosure rules in cases where they are appropriate and
otherwise relying on pre-1993 discovery management tools-emerges
as the appropriate focal point of inquiry. It provides a glimpse of a
potentially meaningful discovery, and perhaps even disclosure, future.

